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What it takes to make a ‘thing’
(Fichte, Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen
der Wissenchaftslehre)
M. Jorge de Carvalho
 
1. Introductory remarks
Contrary to what may seem to be the case, it is not wholly idle to ask the question ‘what
does it take to make a thing?’ To be sure, we have long been familiar with things, and
indeed with all kinds of things. We are constantly surrounded by them – having them
before us, dealing with them: “limas, umbrales, atlas, copas, clavos,/nos sirven como
tácitos  esclavos,/  ciegas  y  extrañamente  sigilosas!”(“files,  doorsills,  atlases,  wine-
glasses,  nails,/which  serve  us,  like  unspeaking  slaves,  /so  blind  and  so  strangely
reserved!”).1 But at the end of the day, none of this prevents things from being, to
borrow  Augustine’s  words,  “et  usitata  et  abdita”  (both  usual  and  hidden),  “
manifestissima  et  usitatissima,  et  eadem  rursus  nimis  latent,  et  nova  est  inventio
eorum”  (“most  manifest  and  ordinary,  and  yet  too  deeply  hidden,  so  that  their
discovery is still to come”).2 
This  paper focuses on Fichte’s  answer to the said question – more precisely on his
transcendental account of what it takes to make a thing, as laid out in his Grundriss des
Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre (1795). 
First  of  all,  it  should be borne in mind that according to Fichte there is  no simple
answer to the said question. In his view, several requirements must be met if there is to
be a thing as such. In other words, a thing has a variety of structural ingredients, each
of which a) is nothing less than a sine qua non, but on the other hand b) proves unable to
play  the  role  of  a  sufficient condition.  The  result  being  that  a  full  and  satisfactory
answer to the question “What does it  take to make a thing?” must be able both to
identify all the essential ingredients without which there simply can be no ‘thing’ as
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such  and  to  clarify  how  these  various  ingredients  relate  to  each  other  and  work
together in such a way that they bring about ‘things’ as such.
This is what this paper is all about. It tries to work out which ingredients are necessary
to make a ‘thing’ (viz.  an ‘object’) and what their connection is with each other. The
point  is  that  a)  Fichte’s  account  of  the  said  ‘ingredients’  in  his  Grundriss (notably
Empfindung,  Anschauung,  Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht  zu setzen,  reines Nicht-Ich,  Bild, 
Mittelanschauung,  and Ding)  differs from all  others, b) his understanding of each and
every one of these ingredients is surprisingly ground-breaking (and proposes nothing
less than a completely new approach to Empfindung, Anschauung, Vermögen zu setzen oder
nicht zu setzen, Bild, etc.), c)  pretty much the same holds true for Fichte’s view on their
connection with each other – so that d) the Grundriss gives a very singular answer to the
question 'what is a thing?'.
 
2. A very unusual epigenetic ladder
But before we consider the structural ingredients Fichte refers to and examine them
one by one, let us take a closer look at their connection to each other (viz. at Fichte’s
view on how they relate to each other). At first sight we may seem to be putting the
cart before the horse. But in this case, it is advisable to follow this path. For one of the
main points in Fichte’s account of what it takes to make a thing is that the connection
between the various ingredients in question is a key element for defining their own
nature  (that  is,  what  makes  each  of  them  as  such).  In  other  words,  each  of  the
structural ingredients Fichte is referring to is essentially defined by its connection with
all the others, and indeed in such a way that it simply cannot be itself without the
others. We are inclined to understand structural ingredients as something completely
independent  from  their  connection with  each  other  and  the  latter  as  something
superadded to the former. But Fichte wants us to think the other way around and to
realize that what we are dealing with here is like an organism whose essential living
parts cannot be separated from the whole (that is from one another). 
But this is still too vague. We need to be more specific about this topic. 
As a matter of fact,  Fichte’s view on the connection between the various structural
ingredients he is referring to rests on three main claims. 
First, there is something of a fixed order between the structural ingredients in question:
one of them – namely what Fichte terms Empfindung – provides the basis for all the
others. As for the latter, each of them brings something entirely new: the second brings
something  new  in  comparison  with  the  first,  the  third  brings  something  new  in
comparison  with the  second,  and  so  on  and  so  forth  (Anschauung with  regard  to
Empfindung,  Vermögen zu setzen oder  nicht  zu setzen with regard to Anschauung,  reines
Nicht-Ich with regard to the Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen, etc.).  In short, to
borrow Kant’s notion of “epigenesis”,3 Fichte presents what might be described as a
succession of epigenetic discontinuities and epigenetic leaps leading up to the ‘thing’ as
such (viz. to the representation of ‘things’).
Secondly, in the epigenetic sequence Fichte’s Grundriss is all about the reason why each
superadded element requires the previous one(s) is that it consists in nothing other
than  a  re-representation of  them  (Anschauung  re-represents  Empfindung,  Vermögen  zu
setzen  oder  nicht  zu  setzen re- represents  Anschauung,  etc.).  In  other  words,  the  new
includes the old. The epigenetic element is not something completely unrelated to the old,
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but rather the old appearing in a new light: idem sed aliter (the same, but otherwise). We
can also express this by resorting to Aristotle’s time-honoured comparison between the
ψυχή and geometrical figures – in particular the fact that a triangle is always implied by
a  quadrilateral (for  the  latter  is,  by  nature,  a  transformed  triangle:  a  triangle  +
something else, which completely transforms it and makes it disappear into the new
figure).4 In short, the point is that each successive term of the epigenetic ladder Fichte’s
Grundriss refers  to  contains and  transforms its  predecessor,  so  that  the  former  is  a
transformed version of the latter. 
But thirdly all this is completely changed by a further claim. The two afore-mentioned
features are shared by almost all versions of what might be termed the scala cognitionis
in the western philosophical tradition, from Plato and Aristotle to Kant. Not so with the
third claim, namely that each epigenetic element (i.e., each higher level) is nothing less
than the sole way in which its predecessor is possible (the point being that Empfindung is
only possible as Anschauung, the latter is only possible as Bild, and so on and so forth).
In other words,  Fichte’s  view amounts to claiming that each epigenetic  element he
refers to is the key to how its predecessor is possible (and hence a sine qua non for it).
Anschauung is key to the possibility of Empfindung, Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen
is key to the possibility of Anschauung,  reines Nicht-Ich is key to the possibility of the 
Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen, etc. And therefore Anschauung is a sine qua non for 
Empfindung, Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen is a sine qua non for Anschauung, etc.,
etc. 
Another way of expressing this is by saying, as Fichte does, that each lower level of the
epigenetic scale he is referring to is such because on closer inspection it turns out that
it  is  concerned only with a product (das Produkt, namely the product of  an act:  eine
Handlung) and not with the corresponding act itself (nicht die Handlung selbst).5 On the
following level of the epigenetic ladder "the act which produced this first product is
itself in turn made into a product by means of a new act which is directed at the first
act". (wird die Handlung, durch welche das erste Produkt hervorgebracht wurde, durch eine
Handlung,  die  darauf  geht,  wieder Produkt“).6 The point is  twofold:  first,  on each lower
level, “something is established, without any further determination, to be an act of the
mind”;  then,  on  the  subsequent level  "this  same  thing  is  posited  and  further
determined”,  (was in  jeder  vorhergehenden ohne weitere  Bestimmung als  ein  Handeln  des
Geistes aufgestellt wird, wird in jeder folgenden gesetzt und weiter bestimmt), but in such a
manner that, secondly, it turns out that it “must have already been present” on the
preceding level, namely “as an act” (sich schon in der vorigen Deduktion als ein Handeln
vorfinden).7 The  result  being  that  only  the  highest  level  in  Fichte’s  epigenetic  scale
reveals the complete Handlung – i. e. the real Handlung – the lowest level was already all
about. 
Now, on the one hand, this means that the epigenetic sequence Fichte’s Grundriss is all
about presents, as it were, a very particular chain of conditions of possibility: it presents
the ‘how’ of Empfindung, then the ‘how of the how’, then the ‘how of the how of the how’, etc.
The result being that the representation of ‘things’ as we know it is not just a further
development in the framework of an epigenetic sequence of ever more complex levels
of representation, but indeed nothing less than the key to the very basis of it all, namely
Empfindung. And this in turn means that the representation of ‘things’ as we know it
turns out to be the only possible way of representation (viz. the only possible content
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of appearing) überhaupt.  According to Fichte’ Grundriss,  it is something so absolutely
essential and intrinsic to all representation that there simply is no alternative to it.
On the other hand, this view that the lower levels of the epigenetic ladder are a sine qua
non for the higher ones, but that pretty much the same holds true the other way around
(for the latter are as much a condition of the former as vice versa) is what provides the
concrete  basis  for  the  above-mentioned  claim  concerning  the  organic connection
between all the rungs of the epigenetic ladder we are talking about. In other words, this
is  the  reason why the whole  epigenetic  ladder  bears  the imprint  of  Wechselwirkung 
(reciprocal dependency or interdependency) between all its components and can therefore
be  described  as  an  organism:  something  whose  essential  parts  simply  cannot  be
themselves without all the others. 
So much for the connection between the main ‘characters’ in Fichte’s Grundriss (namely
Empfindung,  Anschauung,  Vermögen  zu  setzen  oder  nicht  zu  setzen,  reines  Nicht-Ich,  Bild,
etc.).8 
 
3. The “original fact” and the “original explanation” 
Bearing  this  in  mind,  let  us  now  take  a  closer  look  at  each  of  them,  their  main
distinctive features and the role they play as an essential component of what it takes to
make a thing. It goes without saying that a thorough and detailed discussion of this
topic would go far beyond the scope of this paper. We must therefore confine ourselves
to the essentials. 
First of all, it should be borne in mind that Fichte’s whole view on this matter is based
on the central insight that even if a thing is supposed to be completely independent from
all  subjective  activity  (so  that  being  completely  independent  from  any  subjective
activity is an essential requirement for it to be a thing), on closer inspection it emerges
that this complete and utter independence is but something posited by the very same
activity it  is  supposed to be completely independent from. In other words, the said
independence is essentially a claim in the framework of subjective activity. It does not
belong to the realm of the independent reality it refers to, but rather to the opposite:
namely to the realm of subjective activity. And indeed so much so that, no matter how
you look at it, it simply cannot be dissociated from the latter. Or to put it in Fichtean
terms, contrary to what might be termed its ‘face value’, no ‘thing’ belongs to the realm
of the simple not-I (i. e. of the absolute not-I, as such). It always belongs to the realm of
the I insofar as it “posits itself as determined by the not-I” (das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt
durch  das  Nicht-Ich).9 In  short,  it  comes  under  what  Fichte  terms  the  fundamental
principle (Grundsatz) of the theoretical Wissenschaftslehre.10
This outlines the overarching framework within which everything else takes place. But
all further developments are based on two closely connected cornerstones of Fichte’s
Grundriss (which at the same time are the two cornerstones of his account of what it
takes to make a ‘thing’). 
The first is Fichte’s claim concerning the only possible way in which “the I can posit
itself as determined by the not-I”, namely the fact that it finds a check on its original
activity (an Anstoss auf die ursprüngliche Thätigkeit des Ich) and posits something “which
is composed of both directions” (etwas aus beiden Richtungen zusammengesetztes), namely
“the original direction of the I’s activity and the [opposing] direction”.11 According to
Fichte’s Grundriss, the “Anstoss auf die ursprüngliche Tätigkeit des Ich” – viz. the fact that
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the activity of the I finds itself “checked” by an “opposing direction – is, as it were, the
stuff all ‘things’ are made of. If it were not for the said Anstoss the I would not be able to
“posit itself as determined by the not-I” and there simply would be no room for ‘things’
as such. At the end of the day, ‘things’ are nothing but a variety of the said etwas aus
beiden  Richtungen  zusammengesetztes.  They  consist  of  an  Anstoss-related  “conflict
between  the  opposing  directions  of  the  I’s  activity”  (Widerstreit  entgegengesetzter
Richtungen der Thätigkeit des Ich).12 They are but a certain way of positing this conflict.
But this is not all. To be sure, the “original fact” – the said Anstoss-related conflict – is a
necessary condition for there to be any ‘things’ as such. But it is by no means a sufficient
condition. In Fichte’s view, there is another equally indispensable condition, which has
to do with what he terms the “original explanation” (ursprüngliche Erklärung) of the said
“original fact”: “Since nothing can be found in the I which the I has not posited within
itself (which follows from the concept of the I), the I must posit the fact in question
within itself. That is, it must originally explain this fact to itself; it must completely
determine it and establish its foundation” (Da im Ich nichts sei kann, das es nicht in sich
setzt  so  muss  es  auch jenes  Faktum in  sich  setzen  d.  i.  es  muss  sich  dasselbe  ursprünglich
erklären, vollständig bestimmen und begründen).13 This is not the place to discuss this topic
in any detail. So let it suffice to remember that “positing the said original fact – the
Anstoss-related conflict – within the I” is tantamount to positing it as activity. The I must
posit the “original fact” in terms of the only kind of determination it is able to posit
and to understand, namely activity. The original fact must be ‘translated’, as it were,
into the only ‘language’ the I ‘speaks’. 
Hence, the “original explanation” Fichte’s Grundriss refers to has to do with reflection
(Reflexion), namely with reflection upon the original fact (the Anstoss-related conflict
between the opposing directions of the I’s activity”). It can be termed original reflection
(ursprüngliche  Reflexion)  because  a)  it  is  inherent  to  the  I,  as  the  latter  finds  itself
determined by the said conflict, and b) it takes place “without conscious participation
on our part” (ohne unser  wissentliches  Zuthun)14,  so that c)  we find ourselves already
shaped by it, and it is, as it were, always already in place before we have any chance of
consciously reflecting about it. 
In  Fichte’  view,  the  original  reflection  and  the  ensuing  ‘original  explanation’  his
Grundriss refers  to  have  to  do  with  the  above-mentioned  principle  that  “nothing
pertains to the I except what it posits within itself” (nichts kommt dem Ich zu, als das, was
es in sich setzt).15 In the final analysis, the original reflection viz. the original explanation
is not something adventitious to the “original fact” itself. On the contrary: it is part and
parcel of it, insofar as it cannot take place without being posited by the I within itself
(which is precisely what the “original reflection” and the “original explanation” are all
about).  It  is  constitutive and  hence  the  very  opposite  of  what  might  be  termed  an
‘adventitious reflection’ or an ‘adventitious explanation’. In short, it is as much part
and parcel of the I (N.B. of the I as it posits itself as determined by the not-I) as is the
underlying “original fact” (the Anstoss-related conflict) it refers to. 
Now, as it turns out, the ‘original explanation’ (the process whereby the I posits the
original  Anstoss-related fact  within itself)  is  the fons  et  origo of  the above mentioned
‘epigenetic  ladder’.  Empfindung, Anschauung, etc  are  “the  various  distinguishable
elements in this process of explanation” (die verschiedenen unterscheidbaren Momente im
Fortgang  dieser  Erklärung).16 And  the  intricate  and  organic  connection  we  have
highlighted  above  expresses  the  interwoven character  of  the  ‘original  explanation’
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Fichte’s Grundriss is all about and the way in which its various components cannot be
isolated from one another. And this in turn means that one of the essential features of
Fichte’s view on what it takes to make a ‘thing’ is that according to him all ‘things’ as
such are the product not just of the above-mentioned Anstoss-related original fact, but
also of the said “original reflection and explanation” – so that, surprising as it may
seem, reflection and explanation (namely the ‘original explanation’ of the Anstoss-related




With all this in mind let us now turn our attention to the first rung of the ‘epigenetic
ladder’  (viz.  the  first  of  “the  various  distinguishable  elements”  in  the  “process  of
original explanation”17) Fichte’s Grundriss is all about – namely Empfindung or sensation. 
First, it should be borne in mind that here we are dealing with what might be described
as conceptual ‘false friends’. Fichte resorts to the traditional terminology: Empfindung
(viz.  sensatio or  sensation).  But  his  understanding  of  what  these  words  stand  for  is
utterly different from the generally accepted sense (N.B. not because he has a different
phenomenon viz. a different ‘referent’ in mind, but because he takes a very different view
on what Empfindung – viz. the phenomenon in question – is all  about (i.e.  on what it
actually consists of). Now it is important to get this right, because in this case, too, a
small deviation in the beginning causes large deviations at the end – and indeed so
much  so  that  we  run  the  risk  of  missing  the  whole  point  of  Fichte's  “original
explanation”  viz.  of  his  “epigenetic  ladder”  (and  therefore  the  whole  point  of  his
answer to the question ‘What does it take to make an object?’). 
The widely held view on Empfindung or sensation (and the one we tend to assume by
default)  is  that  Empfindung or sensation has to  do with sensory qualities  impinging
themselves upon a receptor and producing some kind of direct contact with them – in
such a way  that the content of any such Empfindung or sensation is the sensory quality
itself and Empfindung or sensation as such consists in the reception of sensory qualities:
what  might  be  described  as  a  simple reception  of  the  simple  sensory  qualities  in
question (there may be more than one sensory quality being sensed at the same time,
but their simultaneous presence results from several different acts of reception, each of
which amounts to the simple reception of the simple sensory qualities at stake). Even
when it stresses the fact that Empfindung or sensation results from being affected (that it
is the effect of something else – and therefore intrinsically complex), this view tacitly
assumes  that  the  content  of  Empfindung itself  is  something  simple:  a  simple  sensory
quality  appearing  or  imposing  its  presence  (i.e.  something  like  a  simple  and  inert
“being there”). Moreover, the widely held view on Empfindung or sensation takes it to
be divided into two domains: the realm of inner and the realm of outer Empfindung viz.
sensation; so that each Empfindung or sensation is constituted in such a manner that it
belongs to one of these two realms. Finally,  the widely held view on Empfindung or
sensation teaches what might be described as the primacy of outer over inner sensation:
the former precedes the latter and paves the way for it, insofar as the latter is, as it
were,  but  a  ‘second  degree’  sensation:  a  sensation  of  sensation  (namely  of  outer
sensation itself). 
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Now, Fichte’s understanding of Empfindung or sensation departs from this view in two
ways. 
4.1 First, he stresses the fact that Empfindung or sensation is essentially Anstoss-related
– i.e. conflict-related. He points out that Empfindung or sensation has to do with checked 
activity (the activity of the I being countered, inhibited or hindered by an opposing force).
But the point is that this does not have to do merely with the origin of Empfindung or
sensation. The point is that the very content of all Empfindung or sensation bears the
imprint of all this; so that, far from consisting in a simple quality, the very content of
sensation is itself intrinsically made of activity x activity: it consists itself in activity of
the I being checked or hindered by an opposing force); so that it is itself intrinsically
conflict-related (and indeed nothing but conflict-torn activity: im Widerstreit befindliche
Thätigkeit).18We  can also  express  this  by  saying  that  Empfindung or  sensation  is
essentially  Anstoss-related  not  in  the  sense  that  it  results  from  Anstoss (so  that  its
content is a simple quality resulting from Anstoss), but in the sense that the sensory
content is itself Anstoss – includes Anstoss and is all about Anstoss, i. e. a “mixed activity,
an activity which conflicts with and halts itself” (gemischte, sich selsbst widerstrebende,
und sich selbst vernichtende Thätigkeit.19
Now,  this  particular  view  on  the  connection  between  Empfindung or  sensation  and
Anstoss also means the following: contrary to what seems to be the case, each sensory
content 
is intrinsically composite, not a simple quality; 
is always intrinsically fraught with tension, not something inert;
is always intrinsically relative to the activity of the I (and this means: to real activity of the I), so
that 3.1 it always takes place in the middle (or in the course) of some activity of the I, 3.2 it is
itself pervaded by the activity of the I, and indeed in such a manner that 3.3 in the final
analysis, it is itself all about the activity in question (i. e. about what is going on with the
activity of the I viz. about the fact that the latter finds itself checked in this or that manner); 
the  result  being  that  the  sensory  content  itself  is  but  suppressed  activity ( unterdrückte
Thätigkeit), inhibited, cancelled or diminished activity – N.B. not simple absence of activity, but
rather hindered activity (activity in the process of being hindered), and indeed so much so
that
a sensory content never limits itself to being just there: the whole point in Empfindung or
sensation is that the I (i.e. its activity) finds itself ‘tackled’, caught or seized by the sensory
content (that is, by hindered or diminished activity). 
Fichte expresses this very particular nature of Empfindung by means of an idiosyncratic
explanation of the meaning of the word, which reads Empfindung as Insichfindung (a
finding-within-oneself).20 He  writes:  “Only  what  is  foreign  is  ever  found;  what  was
originally posited in the I is always present.) What is sensed [i.e., what is found within
oneself] is that activity of the I which has been cancelled and destroyed. This is sensed
(found in the I)  and is  something foreign insofar  as  it  is  suppressed.  But  it  cannot
originally be suppressed, nor can it be suppressed by the I itself. This is sensed (found
within the I)  insofar as it  is  suppressed only under the condition that an opposing
activity is posited, and if this opposing activity were to be abolished, what is sensed
[viz., the cancelled activity of the I] would itself be pure activity. (Nur das fremdartige
wird gefunden; das ursprünglich im Ich gesetzte ist  immer da.)  Die aufgehobene vernichtete
Thätigkeit des Ich ist das Empfundene. Sie ist empfunden, fremdartig, inwiefern sie unterdrückt
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etwas  im  Ich  –  inwiefern  sie  nur  unter  der  Bedingung  einer  entgegengesetzten  Thätigkeit
unterdrückt ist, und, wenn diese Thätigkeit wegfiele, selbst Thätigkeit, und reine Thätigkit seyn
würde).21 The point of this idiosyncratic etymology is twofold. On the one hand, Fichte
stresses  the  connection between Empfindung (Empfinden)  and Finden  –  i.e. finding,  as
such.  Sensation  is  essentially  relative  to  something  foreign ( das  Fremdartige)  –  to  a
“foreign body”, as it were: foreign to the activity of the I (standing in its way, interfering
with it, countering it, meddling with it), as opposed to the fact a) that the activity of the
I must be constitutively there (immer da)  before any such finding and b) provides the
medium in which the latter can take place. On the other hand, according to Fichte, the
prefix “Ent-” expresses this very fact: that the finding in question takes place within the
I (im Ich), and indeed so much so that das Fremdartige (the ‘foreign body’ itself) is and
must be sensed within the I – as something ‘tackling’, as it were, the activity of the I and
preventing it from being pure activity. In short, the point is that in this case both the
finding and the found are nothing but modifications of the activity of the I (modified activity
of the I). 
4.2 Secondly, Fichte’s account of sensation differs from the widely held view because,
according to him, Empfindung has nothing to do with the said either-or between the two
alleged realms of inner and outer sensation, and there is no such thing as a primacy of
the latter over the former. 
To be sure, Fichte’s Empfindung is essentially conflict-torn and intrinsically related to
the two opposite  activities  it  is  made of.  As  pointed out  above,  its  very  content  is
constitutively related both to the I and to the not-I. And the whole point in Fichte’s
view seems to be that das Empfundene constitutively refers to and is in contact with the
two opposite factors of the conflict or Widerstreit it is all about – namely what might be
described as an inner and an outer field of activity. In other words, Empfindung (and
indeed das Empfundene) is nothing but mixed activity; but precisely because it has this
mixed nature, it constitutively refers to and is in contact with what the Grundriss terms
the two “pure activities”: the “pure activity” of the I and the “pure activity” of the not-
I.22 To this extent, Fichte’s Empfindung (and indeed its content: das Empfundene) seems to
suit  the  contrast  between  inner  and  outer  sensation.  And,  on  the  other  hand,
everything  in  Fichte’s  account  of  Empfindung seems  to  stress  that  all  sensation  is
primarily related to the not-I. So that, as Fichte puts it, Empfindung is “the ultimate
reason why the I goes beyond itself and posits something outside of itself. For here, for
the first time, something disengages itself from the I (…), something which, by means of
further determination,  will  gradually transform itself  into a universe with all  of  its
characteristic  features  (der  letzte  Grund,  warum das  Ich  aus  sich  herausgeht,  und  etwas
ausser sich setzt. Hier löst sich (...) etwas ab von dem Ich; welches durch weitere Bestimmung
sich allmählig in ein Universum mit allen seinen Merkmalen verwandeln wird).23 And this may
give  the  impression  that  Fichte’s  account  of  Empfindung endorses  the  said  primacy
claim. 
However, this impression proves to be completely misleading. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  according  to  Fichte’s  Grundriss all  Empfindung is  essentially
indifferent to the contrast between inner and outer sensation (let alone to anything
even remotely resembling a primacy of the latter over the former). Empfindung (and
indeed its content) is, of course, intrinsically related both to the I and the Not I, but in
such a way that it does not present either of them. That is, it leaves them out, as it were,
and presents just the ‘mesh’ of both (neither of the two pure activities, just the mixed
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activity as such: I×not-I). In other words, the I and the not-I – viz. their opposite pure
activities – are essentially involved. But the point is precisely that they do not appear as
themselves or in their own role. The said mixed activity (the Widerstreit or conflict as such)
is the sole content in sight. We can also express this by saying that the only content of
Empfindung is  the  epicentre  of  the  conflict  or  Widerstreit in  question.  A  complete
‘eclipse’  of  the pure elements in question (both the I  and the not-I)  is  an essential
feature of this first rung of the epigenetic ladder. And pretty much the same holds true
for what might be termed the structural elements of sensation, notably the sensed object
(der Gegenstand  der  Empfindung)  and  the  sensing  subject ( das  Empfindende).  However
involved they may be in Empfindung (as intrinsic constituents and sine quibus non factors
of all sensation), they simply do not feature in the sensory content as such. 
This cannot be emphasized enough. For it is as much a characteristic feature of Fichte’s
view on Empfindung as the above-mentioned claim that the latter has nothing to do
with simple sensory qualities, that it is always intrinsically activity-related, etc. If one
is not keenly aware of these two sides of the coin, one simply misses the particularity of
Fichte’s account. 
The Grundriss could hardly be more peremptory in this respect.  Fichte writes:  “The
subject of sensation, or sensor, is of course the I that (in the action we have derived) is
engaged in relating. Of course this I, to the extent that it senses, is not itself sensed.
Thus we are not concerned with this I at this point. (…) Nor are we here concerned with
the opposing activity of the not-I, which is excluded in sensation. Like the relating I,
this activity is not sensed, for it must be excluded if sensation is to be possible at all.
(Das Empfindende ist begreiflicherweise das in der abgeleiteten Handlung beziehende Ich; und
dasselbe wird begreiflicherweise nicht empfunden, inwiefern es empfindet; und es ist demnach
hier  von  demselben  gar  nicht  die  Rede.  (…)  Ebensowenig  ist  hier  die  Rede  von  der  in  der
Empfindng ausgeschlossenen entgegengesetzten Thätigkeit des Nicht-Ich; denn auch diese wird
nicht  empfunden,  da  sie  ja  zum  Behuf  der  Möglichkeit  der  Empfindung  überhaupt
ausgeschlossen werden muss.)24 
And at the beginning of section 2 he insists: “In the preceding section sensation has
been deduced as an action of the I, through which the I appropriates and relates to
itself something foreign which it has found within itself. We became acquainted with
both this action itself (sensation) and the object of this action (that which is sensed).
However, the sensor (the I engaged in this action) and the activity of the not-I (which,
in sensation, is excluded and is opposed to the I) remained unknown (…)” (Es ist  im
vorigen § deducirt worden die Empfindung als eine Handlung des Ich, durch welche dasselbe
etwas in sich aufgefundenes fremartiges auf sich bezieht, sich zueignet, in sich setzt. Wir lernten
kennen sowohl diese Handlung selbst, oder die Empfindung, als den Gegenstand derselben, das
Empfundene. Unbekannt blieb (…) sowohl das Empfindende, das in jener Handlung thätige Ich,
als auch die in der Empfindung ausgeschlossene, und dem Ich entgegengesetzte Thätigkeit des
Nicht-Ich).25
To put it pointedly: in itself (or for itself) Empfindung is just das Empfundene (that which
is  sensed):  the  bare  Empfundenes,  and nothing else.  In  order  to  understand the full
meaning of  this,  one has to bear in mind that “das Empfundene” denotes the bare
content of Empfindung as sensed by Empfindung itself – and not the pure not-I viz. the
pure  activity  of  the  not-I  (die  in  der  Empfindung  ausgeschlossene,  und  dem  Ich
entgegengesetzte  Thätigkeit  des  Nicht-Ich)26 The mere fact that we speak of Empfindung 
makes  us  think  of  the  whole  set:  a)  of  Empfindung itself,  b)  of  its  content  (das
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Empfundene),  c)  of  the  sensor  (das  Empfindende),  and  d)  of  the  not-I  viz.  the  object
Empfindung is supposed to be all about. But the crux of the matter is that from the point
of view of Empfindung itself (i. e. seen from the perspective of Empfindung) there is no such
complex  set  of  different  elements:  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  nothing  but  das
Empfundene itself.  And even if there can be no Empfundenes without Empfindung (the
activity of Empfinden as such), the fact remains that the latter is completely absorbed in its
content – so that this being-completely-absorbed-in-its content is one of the essential
features of Empfindung or sensation as such. 
Now this gives us a glimpse into another facet of the connection between Empfindung
and  sensory  qualities.  The  complete  absorption  in  das  Empfundene viz.  in  the
intersection point (or crossover point: in the Grenzpunkt)27 between the two conflicting
activities  at  stake  –  and the  corresponding  ‘eclipse’  of  the  latter  as  pure  activities
(owing to which they act as ‘grey eminences’ in the background and remain completely
inconspicuous)  –  make  the  content  of  Empfindung confusingly  similar  to  a  simple
quality. 
It is as if Empfindung were the resultant of a system of forces (the combined system of the I
and  the  not-I  and  of  their  pure  activities),  the  point  being  that  the  ‘resultant’  in
question  makes  itself  notably  felt,  while  the  two  components  of  the  force  system
remain outside the sensory content and hence beyond the horizon of Empfindung.28 
And  this  in  turn  enables  us  to  understand  how  Fichte’s  account  also  includes  an
explanation of the widely held view on sensation or Empfindung. As pointed out above,
this widely held view fails to notice several important features of Empfindung as such, to
wit a) the composite nature of what it deems to be simple, b) the essential connection
between Empfindung and activity viz. the fact that the sensory content is itself all about
Anstoss (real activity caught in something that counters it), etc., etc. But this is not all.
Fichte’s account draws our attention to another point, namely the fact that the widely
held view on sensation fails to notice its own composite nature – namely that it combines
(and confuses) Empfindung proper with a further reflexive transformation of Empfindung
viz. with the second step of the “original explanation” Fichte’s Grundriss is all about, to
wit Anschauung.  The point is  that the widely held view looks back at Empfindung or
sensation  through  the  spectacles  of  Anschauung,  the  result  being  that  it  projects
features of Anschauung into Empfindung. The Grundriss tries to undo this mistake and to
extract, as it were, or to uncover the particular nature of Empfindung proper. 
So much for the first rung of Fichte’s epigenetic ladder. It hardly needs emphasizing
that, even though Empfindung is a sine qua non of things, it is itself after all not much of a
thing (there is not much of a ‘thing’ in it). And this is why, according to Fichte, for
there to be any ‘things’, Empfindung must be transformed into the second rung of his
epigenetic ladder, namely Anschauung. So let us take a closer look at this second rung. 
 
5. Anschauung
What we have just seen provides a good starting point for understanding what Fichte’s
Anschauung stands for.  Among other things,  Empfindung is  characterized by the said
twofold eclipse (both an eclipse of the I as such viz. of its pure activity and an eclipse of
the not-I  viz.  of its pure activity).  What characterizes Anschauung is  the fact that it
overcomes this twofold eclipse. In other words, the distinctive feature of this second
rung of Fichte’s epigenetic ladder is that Anschauung (and only Anschauung) – precisely
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because it goes beyond Empfindung – brings to pass what the said widely held view on
Empfindung attributes to Empfindung itself – namely both 
that  it  has  to  do  with  sensory  qualities  impinging  themselves  upon  a  ‘receptor’'  and
producing some kind of direct contact with them – in such a way that the ‘reception’ itself is
precisely just that (the pure I as ‘sensor’ or ‘receiver’), and the content of any such ‘reception’
is the sensory quality itself (a pure not-I that is sensed or ‘received’) in such a manner that
its presence is something like a simple and “inert” “being there”, and 
that it has to do with the contrast between an inner and an outer domain – so that each such
reception pertains to one of the two domains in question. 
In  comparison  with  Empfindung Fichte’s  Anschauung or  intuition  widens  the  angle. 
Anschauung has to do with ‘inclusion of the excluded’, namely with 1) inclusion of the pure
I viz. of pure activity of the I as such (viz. inclusion of the sensor – das Empfindende – as
such, and 2) inclusion of the pure not-I viz. of the pure activity of the not-I as such (viz.
inclusion of the pure object of sensation). In other words, Anschauung has to do with an
extraordinary  expansion  of  the  framework:  it  explodes,  as  it  were,  the  narrow
framework of Empfindung by letting in (into ‘appearance’) what Empfindung as such has
to  leave  out.  We  can  also  express  this  by  saying  that  Anschauung  incorporates  the
excluded extremes (die “ausgeschlossenen äussersten Enden”)29 of sensation. And this is
closely  connected  with  Fichte’s  above-mentioned view on how a  lower  level  of  his
epigenetic ladder is related to the product of a given act, whereas only the subsequent
epigenetic level unveils the act in question30: Empfindung does not perceive itself but
only das Empfundene (the sensory content); Anschauung is where Empfindung (N.B. not
Empfindung as a product, but Empfindung as a Handlung) makes its first appearance. 
But this is not sufficiently precise. To be more precise, it should be said that Anschauung
provides a certain way of including what Empfindung must leave out. The crux of the
matter is the particular way in which Anschauung brings this to pass. And one of the
distinctive features of Anschauung in the Fichtean sense of the word is that there is
reciprocal dependency or interdependency (Wechselwirkung) between the two ‘extensions of
borders’ we are talking about: a) the extension towards the I and the pure activity of
the  I  viz.  the  extension  towards  the  sensor ( das Empfindende)  and  b)  the  extension
towards the pure not-I and the pure object of sensation. According to Fichte’s Grundriss,
neither of them can take place without the other. So that the leap of Anschauung is
possible only uno tenore (‘in one fell swoop’, as it were). 
But this is not all. The crux of the matter is Fichte’s view on the concrete way in which
this takes place. 
The root of it all is the conflict (Widerstreit) or inner tension inherent in Empfindung as
such and which triggers all further developments. It provides the basis for what might
be described as the extraction or isolation of its two poles, namely the I and the not-I (viz.
their corresponding pure activities), which are extracted, as it were, from the ore (the
mixed  activity  viz.  the  mesh)  of  Empfindung.  This  transformation  process  has  a
threefold result: first, it provides the access to the said “excluded extremes”: it makes
them appear  and brings  them into  the  equation;  secondly,  it  shifts  the  focus  from
Empfindung itself to the “newcomers”, so that the pure I and the pure not-I (viz. the
sensor and the sensed object) become, as it were, the two main characters; thirdly, the
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In other words, Anchauung turns out to be all about a split or fission of the original
mesh – namely I × not-I,  Empfindung × Empfundenes (i.e.  Empfindung completely
absorbed  in  das  Empfundene).  That  is,  Anschauung is  all  about  differentiation  of  the
undifferentiated and  the  transmutation  of  Empfindung into  the  result  of  this
differentiation. As pointed out above, one key feature of this differentiation-process is
the fact that it goes in two opposite directions and has two termini ad quos. But then
again the key is not so much the fact that Empfindung splits into two separate domains
(and that the latter have to do with the pure I and the pure not-I) as the concrete way
in which the two domains in question make their appearance in Anchauung: i.e. in what
light the pure I and the pure not-I (the sensor and the sensed object) appear to what
Fichte terms Anschauung. 
 First, it should be borne in mind that in the light of Anschauung the whole (the whole
horizon) looks quite different. In the realm of sensation there is nothing but mixed
activity (the above-mentioned ‘mesh’ and above all das Empfundene). The latter is, as it
were,  the  sole  content.  Whereas  in  the  realm  of  Anschauung,  the  whole  horizon  of
Empfindung becomes the middle term between the two said extremes (äusserste Enden),
namely the pure I and the pure not-I – one of which is, as it were, more inward than the
most inward in Empfindung, while the other manages to be more exterior than the most
exterior in Empfindung (i.e, than das Empfundene itself). 
Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the isolated activity of the I is posited as
something previous to Empfindung, and therefore as an “activity which is not suppressed
or  hindered  by  any  opposing  force”  (als  nicht  unterdrückt,  noch  gehemmt  durch  eine
entgegengesetzte  Kraft).31 Something  similar  applies  to  the  isolated  not-I.  It,  too,  is
posited as something previous to Empfindung – and therefore as something in its own
right (as an autonomous and self-contained not-I). But the point is that Empfindung must
be some kind of relation between both (namely between pure, completely unhindered
activity of the I, on the one hand, and an entirely autonomous and self-contained not-I,
on the other). What is more, the said relation must combine both features: it must be a)
pure, unhindered activity (for otherwise it would not pertain to the pure I), but also b)
passivity or Leiden (for otherwise it would not be related or directed to the pure not-I: it
would not conform to it). And this means that it must be “a tertium quid which is activity
(of the I) and passivity (suppressed activity) at the same time (ein bestimtes drittes (…) das
Thätigkeit (des Ich) und zugleich Leiden (unterdrückter Thätigkeit) sey).32 Or, as Fichte also
puts it, it must have the I as its Real-Grund33 and the not-I as its Ideal-Grund.34 However, it
is not just a matter of combining both: the point is rather that “its Ideal-Grund and Real-
Grund should be intimately united; they should be one and the same. (Ideal- und Real-
Grund sollen in ihm innig vereinigt, Eins und ebendasselbe seyn).35 
Put another way, the action in question must be of a very special nature. “It is an action
of the I and must be capable of being regarded as something which has its basis solely
and entirely in the I.  At the same time it must be capable of being regarded as the
product  of  an  activity  of  the  not-I,  as  something  which,  in  all  of  its  specific
determinations, has its basis in the not-I (Es ist ein Handeln des Ich, und soll sich seiner
ganzen Bestimmung nach betrachten lassen, als bloss und lediglich im Ich begründet36 Es soll
sich  zugleich  betrachten  lassen  als  Produkt  eines  Handelns  des  Nicht-Ich,  als  allen  seinen
Bestimmungen  nach  im  Nicht-Ich  begründet)37 In  short,  the  activity  in  question  must
combine activity and passivity in such a manner that “each should be exactly what the
other is” (Die eine soll gerade seyn, was die andere ist, und umgekehrt).38
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According to Fichte, this is what Anschauung is all about. And, what is more, Anschauung
is the only kind of activity that meets these conflicting requirements, and “one can see
at once that the act in question must be one of intuiting (so sieht man sogleich, dass die
Handlung ein Anschauen seyn müsse).39 
This  unique  blend  of  properties is  reflected  in  the  inner  connection  between
Anschauung (viz. the intuiting I) and das Angeschaute (the intuited content viz. the intuited
not-I). On the one hand, “the I contemplates a not-I, and this act of contemplating is all
that pertains to the I at this point. It posits itself, as such, in this act of contemplating,
and  it  does  so  completely  independently  of  the  not-I.  It  engages  in  contemplation
entirely on its own and without the slightest external compulsion“ (Das Ich betrachtet
ein Nicht-Ich, und es kommt ihm hier weiter nichts zu, als das Betrachten. Es setzt sich in der
Betrachtung, als solcher, völlig unabhängig vom Nicht-Ich; es betrachtet aus eigenem Antriebe
ohne die geringste Nöthigung von aussen (...)).40But on the other hand, Anschauung “posits
these  properties  as  copies  of  something  present  outside  of  the  I.  These  copied
properties are supposed to be actually encountered in what takes place outside the I –
and  not  merely  because  they  were  posited  in  consciousness,  but  in  a  manner
completely independent from the I (Aber es setzt dieselben als Nachbildungen eines ausser
ihm Vorhandenen. - In diesem ausser ihm Vorhandenen sollen nun die nachgebildeten Merkmale
wirklich  anzutreffen  seyn,  und  zwar  nicht  etwa  zufolge  des  Gesetztseyns  im  Bewusstseyn,
sondern völlig unabhängig vom Ich (…)).41
But  this  is  not  all.  The  characteristic  interlocking  of  activity  and  passivity  which
inheres in Anschauung does not prevent it from being associated with a particular kind
of forgetfulness, owing to which the awareness of its own passivity tends to prevail over
the awareness of its own activity “(..) the I forgets itself in the object of it activity. Here
we have an activity which appears to be only passivity (..). Intuition is the name of this
action, a silent, unconscious contemplation, which loses itself in its object.” (Also das Ich
vergisst in dem Objecte seiner Thätigkeit sich selbst, und wir haben eine Thätigkeit, die lediglich
als  ein  Leiden  erscheint  (...).  Diese  Handlung  heisst  eine  Anschauung;  eine  stumme,
bewusstseynlose  Contemplation,  die  sich  im Gegenstande  verliert.)42 The  result  being that
Anschauung goes hand in hand with a prominence of the object – around which everything
else seems to revolve. 
To sum up, in its own eyes Anschauung is rooted both a) in the isolated, autonomous and
self-contained I and b) in the isolated, autonomous and self-contained not-I. It acts as
an intermediary between both, bridging the gap between them in such a way that its
complete dependency on the one does not prevent it from being nothing but a genuine
replica of the other: “The not-I does not produce the intuition in the I; nor does the I
produce the attribute of the not-I. They must be completely independent of each other,
and yet in the closest harmony.” (Das Nicht-Ich bringt nicht die Anschauung im Ich, das Ich
bringt nicht die Beschaffenheit des Nicht-Ich hervor, sondern beide sollen völlig unabhängig von
einander seyn, und dennoch soll zwischen beiden die innigste Harmonie seyn.)43
All this gives an insight into the inner composition of what might be termed the “world
of  Anschauung” and on how Anschauung plays a  significant role in bridging the gap
between Empfindung (viz. its content) and a ‘thing’.
On the one hand, the world of Anschauung is made up of two separate realms, which are
connected by limitation (Begrenzung): the realm of the intuiting I and the realm of the
intuited not-I. The explanandum of Anschauung, namely sensation “is possible only to
the extent that the I and the not-I mutually limit each other, and it is possible only
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upon the boundary between them. (This boundary is the actual point of union between
the I and the not-I.) They have no other point in common, nor could they, since they
are supposed to be completely opposed to each other. Beyond this common point their
ways part.” (Das Empfinden ist lediglich insofern möglich, inwiefern das Ich und Nicht-Ich sich
gegenseitig begrenzen, und nicht weiter, als auf dieser, beiden gemeinschaftlichen Grenze. (Diese
Grenze ist der eigentliche Vereinigungspunct des Ich und Nicht-Ich. Nichts haben sie gemein, als
diese, und können auch nichts weiter gemein haben, da sie einander völlig entgegengesetzt seyn
sollen. Von diesem gemeinschaftlichen Puncte aus aber scheiden sie sich; (...)).44
But on the other hand, everything depends on the fact that Anschauung or intuition 
crosses  the  said  boundary and  thereby  a)  transfers  something  from  itself  to  what  is
supposed to lie on the other side and b) absorbs into itself something which is supposed
to  pertain  to  what  lies  on  the  other  side:  “From  here  the  I  becomes  an  intellect
(Intelligenz) only by freely crossing this boundary and thereby transferring something
from itself to what is supposed to lie on the other side of this boundary. Considered
from  another  point  of  view,  the  I  becomes  an  intellect  by  absorbing  into  itself
something  which  is  supposed  to  pertain  to  what  lies  on  the  other side  of  this
boundary.” (von ihm aus wird das Ich erst Intelligenz, indem es frei über die Grenze schreitet,
und dadurch etwas aus sich selbst,  über sie hinüber,  und auf dasjenige,  was über derselben
liegen soll, überträgt; oder, wenn man die Sache von einer anderen Seite ansieht, indem es etwas,
das nur dem über derselben liegenden zukommen soll, in sich selbst aufnimmt).45
But two final points deserve attention here. 
Firstly, as mentioned before, Fichte’s Anschauung is characterized not only a) by the fact
that it widens the angle in such a way that both the pure I and the pure not-I (the sensor
and what is sensed) enter the stage as complete characters in their own right, upon
which everything depends, but also b) by the particular way in which this is done. In
this respect it should be borne in mind that the I appears solely as Anschauung and the
not-I appears solely as the correlate of Anschauung: as that which is contemplated and
thereby copied or replicated (nachgebildet) by Anschauung. In other words, there is an
eclipse both of the real activity of the I and of the real activity of the not-I: they both
remain completely out of sight of Anschauung (in a blind spot, so to speak). Anschauung
erases its origins. It masks, as it were, everything it has to do with: both Empfindung and
what it “extracts” from it. It is Insichfindung in the guise of purely contemplative intuition,
hindered activity in the guise of purely intuited qualities (i.e. of a vorhandene Nicht-Ich), a
product of reflection in the guise of immediate contact, the ὕστερον in the guise of a
πρότερον. In short, Anschauung is constitutively made of Vergessenheit. And the above-
mentioned fact that its contemplative activity forgets itself in the object and appears to
be only passivity is just the ‘icing on the cake’. 
Secondly,  we should not forget that Fichte draws our attention to another decisive
factor, namely the role played by what he terms the “feeling of compulsion” (Gefühl des
Zwanges).46 A thorough discussion of his remarks on this subject would go beyond the
scope of this paper. We must therefore confine ourselves to a brief sketch. 
According to Fichte, the “feeling of compulsion” (Gefühl des Zwanges) shapes the whole
epigenetic ladder he is referring to in such a manner that it is part and parcel of each
and every ‘thing’ as such: no ‘thing’ can be such without bearing its imprint. And the
gist of his view on this topic can be summarized as follows: 
The “compulsion” (Zwang) is  naturally  imputed to the intuited not-I:  “(…) I  explain this
feeling to myself on the basis of the intuited not-I” (Ich erkläre mir das Gefühl (...)  aus dem
a. 
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angeschauten  Nicht-Ich)47;  or,  as  Fichte  also puts  it,  “(…)  what  I  see  is  the reason for  the
compulsion I feel.” (das was ich sehe, ist der Grund des gefühlten Zwangs).48
But this is just the way the Gefühl des Zwanges is explained by the I. To be sure, this explanation
(viz. the connection between the Gefühl des Zwanges and the intuited not-I) is part and parcel
of  the phenomenon in question.  But  the fact  remains that,  on the other hand,  the said
explanation has a derived character and stems from something else.
Firstly, it stems from the “original fact” (viz. the Anstoss-related conflict).
Secondly it also stems from the inevitability or the compulsive character of reflection,49 and this
means both d.1 from the fact that reflection cannot be helped, and d.2 from the fact that
reflection viz. its results seem to be absolutely cogent or compelling.
These two components merge together in such a manner that the compulsive character of
reflection (viz. of it results) constitutes a second source in its own right (in addition to the
“original fact”), but at the same time derives strength from its connection with the “original
fact”.
The two sources are confused with one another (or rather: what is composed both of c) and
d) is taken either to be just c) or to be just the immediate product of the object of intuition
(since one fails to realize that intuition and its object are themselves a mix of Empfindung –
viz. the “original fact” – and reflection)
This hybrid and unanalysed form of the Gefühl des Zwanges is, as it were, one of the standard
ingredients of each and every ‘thing’ as such. 
 
6. A twofold metamorphosis
From the above it is clear that Anschauung moves significantly beyond Empfindung and it
is no doubt closer to a ‘thing’ than sensation. Nevertheless, it remains still far removed
from a ‘thing’ as such (still with a long way to go before a ‘thing’, in the full sense of the
word, enters the stage). 
Our next task is to follow two closely connected developments in Fichte’s epigenetic
sequence. Both of them result from Anschauung, which carries within itself the seeds of
further reflexion and therefore of further steps in the process of what Fichte terms the
“original explanation”.
The first development we are referring to has to do with the fact that Anschauung as
such enables the I to appropriate sensation (Empfindung) – i.e. to posit it within itself –
but not to appropriate ‘what is sensed’ (das Empfundene): the isolated Not-I intuition is
all about. As a matter of fact, the latter remains completely outside of the I. It does not
belong to the subjective realm of the I or of intuition (Anschauung): it defines itself by
purely objective viz. pure not-I. But on the other hand, as pointed out above, intuition
must “cross the boundary” and “transfer something of itself to what is supposed to lie
on the other side” and “absorb into itself  something from it”.  Now, this conflicting
border demarcation is the starting point for further reflexion and triggers a significant
change in the self-understanding of Anschauung and therefore in the whole picture. 
Anschauung or  intuition realizes  that  everything depends on its  own activity  –  and
indeed so much so that even ‘what is sensed’ insofar as it is sensed (das Empfundene als
Empfundenes)  –  we  could  also  say  das Angeschaute  als  Angeschautes (the  intuited  as
intuited) – has its basis in the I, namely in what Fichte terms the I’s ‘ability to posit-or-
not-to-posit’ (Vermögen zu setzen und nicht zu setzen). The point is that, at the end of the
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simply  is  no  room for  any Empfundenes or  Angeschautes as  such.  And the  key is,  of
course, not the Setzen or the Nichtsetzen as separate instances, but the either/or itself:
the “zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen” – the ability to posit and at the same time not to posit – as
such. In other words, the subjective power of either positing or non-positing (Setzen
oder Nichtsetzen)  turns out to be the essential  condition upon which das Empfundene
itself depends. The “not-I is posited as a merely contingent condition of what is sensed”
(dass das Nicht Ich als bloss zufällige Bedingung des Empfundenen gesetzt werde).50 Hence, the
Not-I – insofar as it must be sensed or intuited for there to be any relation to it (i.e.
insofar as it is something one is referring to and therefore aware of) turns out to be
something posited. It therefore lies within the sphere of power of the ‘ability to posit-or-
not-to-posit’ – which has its basis solely within the I. In other words, the posited not-I –
the posited pure-not-I itself – turns out to be not on the other side, but on this side (on
the subjective and intrinsically I-related side) of the border between the I and the not-I. 
To be sure, at least at first sight, this seems to hold true just for the sensed or intuited
not-I. The pure not-I seems to remain excluded and to keep its full independence from
the said Vermögen (and therefore from the I and its power of intuition). But on closer
inspection it emerges that this is not so. Paradoxically enough, the pure not-I, too, is
and must be posited. So that it, too, turns out to be not on the other side, but on this side
(on the subjective and intrinsically I-related side) of the border between the I and the
not-I. One can, of course, repeat the attempt and turn to a "new" (to a second, a third, a
fourth, etc.) not-I – namely one which is supposed not to be posited (and therefore to
evade the power of the I, so that it lies completely beyond its sphere: on the other side of the
border). But on closer inspection it emerges that this other not-I (the ‘purer’ not-I), too,
is posited. It therefore lies on this side (on the subjective and intrinsically I-related side) of
the border between the I and the not-I. 
Fichte describes this in the following terms: “Insofar as the I is limited, it extends only
up to the boundary. Insofar as it posits itself as limited, it necessarily goes beyond this
boundary:  it  extends  to  the  boundary itself,  to  the  boundary as  such—and,  since  a
boundary  is  nothing  apart  from  two  opposing  things,  whatever  extends  to  the
boundary as such must also extend to what lies beyond the boundary in question.” 
(Inwiefern  das  Ich  begrenzt  ist,  geht  es  nur  bis  an  die  Grenze.  Inwiefern  es  sich  setzt,  als
begrenzt, geht es nothwendig darüber hinaus; es geht auf die Grenze selbst, als solche, und da
eine  Grenze  nichts  ist,  ohne zwei  entgegengesetzte,  auch auf  das  über  derselben liegende.)51 
Hence,  every  extension  of  the  border  or  limit  between  the  I  and  the  not-I  (every
attempt  to  draw  a  new  border  or  limit  between  them)  presupposes  an  underlying
extension of the positing I – so that the latter goes beyond the new boundary in question
and lies beyond it. It is therefore no exaggeration to speak, as Fichte does, of an activity
“which  is  supposed  to  go  on  and  on  and  never  to  be  limited”  (hinausgehen,  immer
fortgehen; und nirgends begrenzt seyn soll)52 viz. of something “continually hovering and
floating  away”  (fortschwebend)53 –  i.e.,  of  an  “unlimited”  and  “unlimitable  activity”
(unbegrenzte und unbegrenzbare Thätigkeit).54
In short, not even the pure not-I (one feels tempted to say: not even the purest not-I one
can think of) “lies beyond the circumference of the I” (ein Nicht-Ich liegt nie ausserhalb
des Umkreises des Ich).55 And this in turn means that, at the end of the day, there simply
is no Grenze (no limit or boundary) between the I and the not-I. Or as Fichte puts it, the
Grenze in question is  “simultaneously posited and not-posited” ( ist  gesetzt  und nicht-
gesetzt zugleich).56 
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It hardly need emphasizing that all this amounts to an extraordinary hypertrophy of the
positing and non-positing I (viz of  its  activity),  owing to which the positing and non-
positing I becomes, as it were, all-embracing, while the pure not-I – viz its real activity –
recedes, as it were, into an endless distance. The result being that, for all ends and
purposes, the pure not-I ends up quite simply excluded. 
So much for the first reflexive development we are talking about. Let us now consider
the second. 
As pointed out above, Anschauung is characterized by a certain symmetry or equilibrium
between its two poles, the autonomous and self-contained I, on the one hand, and the
autonomous  and  self-contained  not-I,  on  the  other.  But  because  reflexion  on
Anschauung cannot fail to realize that the latter depends on the Vermögen zu setzen oder
nicht  zu  setzen,  it  gives  rise  to  a  new perspective  and thereby undermines  the  said
equilibrium.  In  a  word,  there  is  something  unstable  about  the  symmetric  relation
between the two poles of Anschauung. And the result of this instability is what we have
termed the hypertrophy of the I: the unhindered expansion of an all-embracing I activity. 
Now, according to Fichte, this displacement from the ‘equilibrium position’ gives rise to
what might be described as a  pendulum movement.  The disappearance of  the border
between the I and the not-I proves to be unacceptable, not only because of the above
mentioned “original fact” (viz. the Anstoss-related conflict) but because the I cannot be
posited without limiting it (positing it as limited). “The I can in no way posit itself for itself
without  limiting  itself  and  hence  transcending  itself”  (Das  Ich  kann  sich  für  sich
überhaupt nicht setzen, ohne sich zu begrenzen, und demzufolge aus sich herauszugehen)57 “As
surely as it is an I and is supposed to be limited, it must posit itself as limited; that is, it
must posit in opposition to itself something which limits it. (Es muss, so gewiss es ein Ich
und  begrenzt  seyn  soll,  sich  als  begrenzt  setzen,  d.  i.  es  muss  ein  begrenzendes  sich
entgegensetzen.)58To be sure, this means that both the limit and what lies beyond it must
be posited by the I. But the point is that they must be posited a) as a real boundary (as an
effective limit to the power of the I) and b) as something really lying beyond the boundary
between  the  I  and  the  not-I.  In  other  words,  the  Herausgehen (the  transcending
movement in question) must put all the weight in its facial value (the fact that it is all
about the pure not-I), not in the fact that the latter, too, must be posited. And this
means that Anschauung is restored to its characteristic forgetfulness, owing to which, as
pointed  out  above,  the  awareness  of  its  own  passivity  tends  to  prevail  over  the
awareness of its own activity and “(..) the I forgets itself in the object of it activity”.
We can also express this by saying that the reflection on the all-embracing power of the
positing and non-positing I  ultimately leads to a countermovement or counter-reaction.
The more immediate results of the said reflection prove unstable and indeed untenable.
And  reflection  swings  back  to  the  equilibrium  position.  Or,  to  be  more  precise,  the
restoring movement swings back not to the equilibrium position, but to the opposite 
pole,  namely  to  what  might  be  described  as  the  primacy  of  the  objective  over  the
subjective component and the understanding of intuition as something basically rooted
in Leiden or passivity and intrinsically relative to a pure not-I. 
This countermovement or counter-reaction – namely the counter-movement against
the  ‘hypertrophy  of  the  I’  viz.  against  its  unhindered  expansion as  an  all-embracing
subjective  activity  –  is  what  makes  up  the  second  development:  the  second
metamorphosis of Anschauung. And the point is a) that this second metamorphosis is
only possible after the first (for the latter paves the way for the former), and b) that
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this second metamorphosis plays a key role in transforming Anschauung viz. its content
into a ‘thing’ proper. 
As pointed out above, the ‘Archimedean point’ for this second metamorphosis is the
indispensability of  the  limit  ( Grenze)  between  the  pure  I  and  the  pure  not-I,  the
indispensability of the pure (autonomous and self-contained) not-I, the indispensability of 
Leiden (of a significant degree of passivity) and the indispensability of the primacy of the
Not-I as the root of what is intuited. For the sake of brevity, we can speak of the primacy
of the recovered not-I. We can also speak of ‘inverted primacy’ and thereby express the fact
that it simply cannot take place without the first metamorphosis (i.e. without the threat
of the all-embracing I viz. of the all-embracing subjective activity). 
And it is hardly necessary to say that the ‘recovered not-I’ viz. the ‘inverted primacy’
we are talking about leads to a complete change of perspective. For 
it posits the non-posited – and this means it brackets the corresponding positing- and-non-
positing-activity; it defies and resists its threat, imposing a limit to the allegedly unlimitable
subjective activity (unbegrenzbare Thätigkeit) and stopping its Fortschweben; it prevails over it,
and puts in place a stronghold of resistance of the pure Not-I; 
it sees intuition through the lens of this ‘inverted primacy’; i.e. it sees everything in terms of
this stronghold of resistance to the primacy of the I; the new “not-I” around which it revolves
is no longer the simple not-I Anschauung is all about from the very beginning (the one which
proves unable to resist the threat of the all-embracing I – i.e. what we have termed the first
metamorphosis); it is something else: a confirmed and strengthened version of the pure Not-I
(a prestressed Not-I, as it were – namely the one which overcame the crucial test of the said
first metamorphosis).
The point in all this is that the “Not I”, too, – N.B. the pure not-I (the autonomous and
self-contained not-I) – turns out to be equivocal and indeed a ‘conceptual false friend’. On
the one hand, there is the “simple” pure-Not-I (let us term it the first pure-not-I or the
first outer world – namely the one that is not immune to the threat of the all-embracing I
viz. to the said first metamorphosis). On the other hand, there is the ‘recovered’ not-I or
the  stronghold  of  resistance to  the  all-embracing  power  of  subjectivity  –  something
intrinsically rooted in the above-mentioned ‘Archimedean point’ (that is, the reflexive
realization that  the  limit  (Grenze)  between the  pure  I  and the  pure  not-I,  the  pure
(autonomous and self-contained) not-I, etc. are absolutely indispensable. Let us term it
the second pure-not-I or the second outer world – the recovered not-I or the recovered outer
world. 
Contrary to what may seem to be the case, the latter – not the former – is what it takes
to make a ‘thing’.  The first pure-Not-I (the simple pure-not-I Anschauung is all  about
from the very beginning) is insufficient for this purpose. It must be transformed and
take the form of the second pure-Not-I (viz. of the recovered pure-not-I) before it can
become a ‘thing’ proper.
One final remark before we close this part of our subject. According to Fichte, what we
have termed the second pure-not-I (the recovered pure-not-I) and the whole new picture
it stands for goes beyond Anschauung and adds a new rung in Fichte’s epigenetic ladder.
But  this  does  not  change  the  fact  that  it,  too,  is  riddled  with  forgetfulness
(Vergessenheit)  and  indeed  very  far  from  providing real  insight  into  either  a)  the
explanandum (the “original fact” it is supposed to explain), b) its own composition (i.e.
what the explanation itself is made of) and c) the very components the explanation in
question  resorts  to  (and  notably  the  key  idea  of  the  ‘second  pure-not-I’.59 Fichte’s
a. 
b. 
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purpose is just to grasp the underlying “original explanation” which is part and parcel
of what we call ‘things’. He is by no means trying to show that the said explanation is
sound and consistent.
 
7. Bild, Mittelanschauung and Ding
Lastly, let us now add some remarks on a further rung of Fichte’s epigenetic ladder (i.e.
a further major component of what it takes to make a thing) – namely Bild and Ding
(image and  thing  proper)  –  or  rather  Bild,  Mittelanschauung  and  Ding (image,
“intermediary  intuition”  and  thing.  Here,  too,  we  are  dealing  with  an  intrinsically
complex (more  precisely:  a  threefold)  sine  qua  non  –  and  the  point  is  that  the  three
components in question (Bild, Mittelanschauung and Ding) are reciprocally dependent or
interdependent, so that none of them can take place without the other. 
As for Bild (image), it should be borne in mind that this further development has to do
with a new level of reflection.60 The point is that in this case the I is characterized both
a) by the “original fact” (the Anstoss-related conflict) and the “original explanation” of
the said fact, and b) by real activity (reale Thätigkeit)61 in the sense that the I also posits
itself  as being able to  posit  something –  namely a not-I  –  as  posited by itself (i.e.  as the
product of  its  own freedom).62 In other words, the new level of reflection differs from
everything up until now in that it takes into consideration the practical power (das
praktische Vermögen) or the practical side of the I viz its freedom: its power to exercise
causality and  to  “determine  the  characteristics  of  things  entirely  on  its  own”  ( die
Beschaffenheit der Dinge durch sich selbst zu bestimmen).63We cannot discuss this topic here
in detail, but it is important to remember what it means: namely that, contrary to what
might seem to be the case, das praktische Vermögen (the practical activity of the I and the
fact that it posits itself as a free I) plays a significant role in the epigenetic ladder laid
out in Fichte’s Grundriss and is indeed a sine qua non for ‘things’ as we know them.
But one might ask: What is the connection between Bild (image) and Freiheit (freedom)
viz. das praktische Vermögen? And what is the connection between the “prestressed not-I”
(the ‘recovered not-I’ – the ‘second not-I’ or the ‘second outer world’ resulting from the
previous rung) and das praktische Vermögen? Last but not least, what is the connection
between freedom (Freiheit) and a ‘thing’ as such?
In this regard the first point is that Anschauung (N.B. Anschauung of the ‘prestressed
not-I’)  does not take place uno tenore as a simple and immediate grasp of the intuitive
content in question. It is rather a complex process, which takes into consideration a
variety of features or defining properties viz. a complex set of criteria. Fichte names size,
shape and colour.64 –  but these are,  of  course,  intended only as  examples.  In other
words, Fichte’s point is that the Anschauung of a ‘thing’ (of any ‘thing’) is an identifying
or determining act giving an answer to the question “what is this?”. And, what is more,
there is no automatic and immediate answer to the said question (no immediate “this is
a book”, “this is a table”, “these are spectacles”, etc.).65 Here, too, everything depends
on an inconspicuous activity – this time an underlying ascertaining process (or ascertaining
activity), so quiet and inconspicuous that its result (N.B.: its result) appears in the guise
of  an  automatic and  immediate  self-evidence  (i. e.  of  an  automatic and  immediate
Anschauung or Leiden).66 Or, to be more precise, according to Fichte the specific identity
of each recovered or prestressed not-I (of each part of what we have termed the “second
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outer world”) is the outcome of a complex transition from a) objectivity in general67 to
b) a specific ‘thing-content’ viz. a concrete thing (‘book’, ‘table’, ‘spectacles’). 
Put  another  way,  Fichte’s  first  point  is  that  there  is  a  complex  sequence  of
determinations leading from the more general to the more specific, in such a way that
the ‘stronghold of the recovered not-I’ (viz. the ‘second outer world’) divides itself and
takes  the  shape  of  a  variety  of  contrasting  determinate  units  (‘book’,  ‘table’,
‘spectacles’, etc.) – that is, of ‘things’ as such.
But this is not all. Secondly, Fichte stresses the fact that the identification process we
are talking about presupposes a further widening of the angle, for it is intrinsically
related to the realm of possibilities. It is, as it were, a weighing process – and this weighing
process  is  rooted  in  a  specific  activity  of  the  I,  namely  the  activity  of  devising
possibilities. In other words, it all depends on free imagination (freie Einbildungskraft).68
Fichte does not elaborate on this topic, but it is easy to see what he is referring to,
namely a) devising the criteria in question (the identification criteria), b) devising the
spectrum of possible features for each of these criteria, and c) devising the spectrum of
their  possible  combinations  (i.e.  the  spectrum of  possible ‘thing-contents’  or  ‘thing
identities’. 
As Fichte point out, this identification process is characterized by the fact that initially
it sways or wavers between different possibilities: “The intuitive faculty oscillates between
various  specific  determinations”  (Das  anschauende  Vermögen  schwebt zwischen
verschiedenen Bestimmungen).69 “As I consider each individual property of this sort, I am
at first doubtful and uncertain. I base my observations upon an arbitrary schema of
shape, size, and colour that approaches the shape, size, and colour of my object. I look
more closely, and only then do I determine more closely my original schema: let us say,
for example, I determine that the shape is that of a cube, the size that of a fist, and the
colour dark green.” (Bei jedem einzelnen Merkmale dieser Art bin ich anfangs zweifelhaft und
schwankend, lege meiner Beobachtung ein willkürliches Schema von einer Figur, einer Grösse,
einer Farbe, die sich denen des Objects nähern, zum Grunde, beobachte genauer, und bestimme
nun erst mein Schema der Figur etwa zu einem Würfel, das der Grösse etwa zu dem einer Faust,
das der Farbe etwa zu dem der dunkelgrünen.)70
We can also express this by saying that Fichte is referring to something along the lines
of Plato’s διάλογος of  the ψυχή with itself  –  the interior conversation highlighted in the
Theaetetus, in the Sophist and in the Philebus.71 
And  this  brings  us  to  what  Fichte  terms  Bild (image)  –  to  wit,  the  outcome  of  the
weighing process in question. Plato highlights the fact that the interior διάλογος (the
discussion within the ψυχή) eventually leads to what he terms a δοξάζειν: an act that
puts  an end to  the  discussion and settles  the  matter.72 Fichte is  apparently referring to
something  similar:  “The  intuiting  faculty  oscillates  between  various  specific
determinations and posits only one from among all those which are possible. From this
determinate act of positing, the product obtains the distinctive character of an image. 
(Das anschauende Vermögen schwebt zwischen verschiedenen Bestimmungen, und setzt unter
allen möglichen nur eine, und dadurch erhält das Product den eigentümlichen Charakter des
Bildes.“73 This is what Bild ( image) is all about: “By means of this transition from an
unspecified  product  of  free  imagination  to  one  which  is  completely  specified  and
determined in one and the same act, what appears in my consciousness becomes an
image and is posited as such.” (Durch diesess Uebergehen von einem unbestimmten Producte
der freien Einbildungskraft zu der völligen Bestimmung in einem und ebendemselben Acte wird
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das,  was  in  meinem  Bewusstseyn  vorkommt,  ein  Bild,  und  wird  gesetzt  als  ein  Bild).74 Put
another way, Bild (image) stands for the conclusion of the said weighing process: for the
transition  from  the  discussion  within  the  I  –  the  devising  of  possibilities  and  the
wavering between various specific determinations (das Schweben zwischen verschiedenen
Möglichkeiten) – to the corresponding decision or verdict: the act that settles or rules the
matter, establishing that the intuitive content in question is an A or B, rather than
anything else. In short, Bild (image) stands for the whole complex process insofar as it
reaches a verdict (i.e. both for the διάλογος and the δοξάζειν, both for the wavering and
for the ensuing decision or ruling.75 
According to Fichte’s Grundriss, this is the distinctive character of every image as such.
To be sure,  there can be no image without Empfindung,  and there can be no image
without Anschauung. But the point is that neither Empfindung nor Anschauung is enough
to produce an image.76 As such, an image requires a) some definite identification of its
content: it must be determinate – it is all about determination (namely the determination
of  the  intuitive  content)77;  and  b)  this  determinate  character  presupposes  both  a
framework of possibilities and their contraction (every image results from narrowing down
the range of possibilities to a specific content). And this in turn means that, contrary to
what might seem to be the case, an image is always a product of reflection – not only of
the  kind  of  reflection  which  is  a  sine  qua  non both  for  Anschauung and  for  the
prestressed not-I), but of an additional kind of reflection, namely the one without which
there simply is no ascertainment of what the intuitive content is all about. 
But here it is important to emphasize that none of this must be conscious. Fichte’s point is
precisely that the reflection he is referring to (that is, both the weighing process and
the verdict or ruling: both Schweben and Bestimmung) can be done in a blink of an eye – and
are mostly done in a blink of an eye, so that they are hardly noticeable. In other words,
Fichte is referring to an unconscious and almost instantaneous version of Plato’s διάλογος
of  the  ψυχή with  itself.  The  verdict  or  decision  is  as  tacit  and  unconscious  as  the
weighing process itself. Both disappear under their product. Both forget themselves and
present their result – the ensuing ‘thing-content’ – as something simply impinging itself
upon the I (as pure and immediate Leiden, not as the result of an activity of the I, let
alone of a twofold activity).
The bottom-line is that both Schweben and Bestimmung (that is: Bild) take place in each
and every case, even when they remain completely unnoticed. And this means that the
twofold process we are talking about is part and parcel of each and every ‘thing’ as such
–  and  indeed  as  part  and  parcel  of  it  as  Empfindung,  Anschauung  and  the  twofold
metamorphosis underlying the prestressed not-I (viz. the ‘second outer world’). 
This cannot be stressed enough: both the weighing process and the ensuing verdict are a
sine qua non for ‘things’ as we know them. So that, surprisingly enough, a ‘thing’ as such
– each ‘thing’  – is  intrinsically related both 1)  to possibility (the ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως 
ἔχειν: the possibility of being otherwise – “dass es auch anders seyn könne”)78 and 2) to
the contraction of the corresponding framework of possibilities (i. e. to a decision of the
‘contest’  between rival possibilities);  and this in such a manner that 3) each ‘thing’
results both from the free imagination of possible contents and from an ascertaining (or
determining) act of the I – and hence from one’s own spontaneity and free activity (i. e from
agency and freedom).  In  this  regard,  too,  ‘things’  turn out  to  be made of  something
completely unsuspected,  hiding behind its result – i.e. they turn out to be something
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completely different (namely completely different from what things are supposed to be)
in the guise of ‘things’ as we know them.
But this is not all.
As  noted  above,  Fichte  draws  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  weighing  process
underlying every image deals with a complex set of properties, so that each ‘thing-
content’ is defined not just by one, but by a variety of predicates. But at this point his
main concern is  what  happens in each case –  i.  e.  with regard to each predicate or
property.79 In other words, his main concern is the basic structure that repeats itself in
all cases. And this is what two further basic concepts of Fichte’s Grundriss – namely
“complete  determination” ( volle  Bestimmung)  and  “intermediary  intuition”
(Mittelanschauung) are all about.  
First, Fichte highlights that in each case both the weighing process and its outcome (its
verdict or ruling) are intrinsically directed to a vollkommene Bestimmung – that is, to the
essential assumption that in each case it must be a certain predicate or property rather
than any other. 
Secondly, Fichte’s point is that this intrinsic relatedness to the vollkommene Bestimmung
is  not  just  an  “immanent”  characteristic  of  the  two  said  activities  of  the  I.  The
vollkommene Bestimmung acts as the focal point of the two activities in question because
they revolve around the not-I. In other words, the activities in question are intrinsically
directed to a vollkommene Bestimmung because they are intrinsically directed to the Not-
I,  and  the  latter  appears  as  being  perforce  completely  determined  (vollkommen
bestimmt). In short, the vollkommene Bestimmung the two activities of the I are all about
is seen as having its origin in the not-I.  We can also express this by saying that the I-
related activity of complete Bestimmung understands itself as tracing or reproducing the
“complete  Bestimmung”  of  the  not-I  in  question –  i.e.  as  conforming  itself  to  a
constitutive feature of the not-I itself, namely that it is vollkommen bestimmt, not because
of the activity of the I, but because it determines itself and cannot be itself without this
complete determination. 
The point is  that the complete Bestimmung is  there from the very beginning of  the
weighing process itself (long before any ruling or verdict), and that it is there from the
very beginning (or rather, that it is set as a task from the very beginning) because it
impinges itself as a basic feature of the Not-I (N. B. of the prestressed isolated- autonomous-
and-self-contained-not-I)  as  such. And  this  is  why  Fichte  speaks  of  an  “intermediary
intuition” (Mittelanschauung) – that is of an intuition which presents itself as bridging the
gap between the activity of the isolated, autonomous and self-contained I, on the one
hand, and the isolated-autonomous-and-self-contained-not-I (the not-I the determining
activity of the I is all about), on the other. Fichte writes: “The I copies the actual thing.
This thing must, therefore, be contained in the I and accessible to its activity; that is,
there must be some demonstrable basis for relating the thing and the image of the
thing (which are opposed to each other).  A completely determined yet unconscious
intuition  of  the  thing  provides  the  basis  for  the  relationship in  question.  All  the
features of the object are completely determined in and for such an intuition. To that
extent the intuition can be related to the thing, and the I remains passive within this
intuition. Nevertheless, the intuition is also an action of the I  and can therefore be
related to the I insofar as it is actively engaged in forming images. As such, the I has
access to the intuition; the image it forms is determined by the specific determinations
it discovers in the intuition. (Or, if you prefer—though the meaning is the same—the I
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freely runs through the determinations present in the image, enumerating and taking
note of them.)”
(Das Ich bildet nach demselben; es muss demnach im Ich enthalten, seiner Thätigkeit zugänglich
seyn: oder, es muss zwischen dem Dinge und dem Bilde vom Dinge, die einander entgegengesetzt
werden, ein Beziehungsgrund sich aufweisen lassen. Ein solcher Beziehungsgrund nun ist eine
völlig  bestimmte,  aber bewusstseynlose  Anschauung des  Dinges.  Für sie  und in ihr  sind alle
Merkmale des Objects vollkommen bestimmt, und insofern ist sie beziehbar auf das Ding, und
das Ich ist in ihr leidend. Dennoch ist sie auch eine Handlung des Ich, und daher beziehbar auf
das  im  Bilden  handelnde  Ich.  Dasselbe  hat  Zugang  zu  ihr;  es  bestimmt  nach  der  in  ihr
angetroffenen Bestimmung sein Bild (oder, wenn man lieber will, — denn beides ist gleichgeltend,
— es durchläuft die in ihm vorhandenen Bestimmungen mit Freiheit, zählt sie auf, und prägt sie
sich ein).80
The point is  that this  Mittelanschauung acts  as the key guiding principle of  the two
aforementioned  activities  of  the  I.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  both  the  wavering  of  the  I
between rival  possibilities81 and  the  ensuing  ruling  or  verdict  are  directed  from the
outset  towards  the  not-I.  They  revolve  around this  particular  kind  of  intuition  (or
relation to the prestressed isolated- autonomous-and-self-contained-not-I), namely its
intuition both as something “available” (so that it does not remain utterly unknown to
the I) and as something intrinsically determined (viz. completely determined,  in the said
sense). 
This particular kind of intuition – the “intermediary intuition” – functions as a ‘ballast’,
providing stability, as it were, to the activity of the I. It is such that 
it  presents itself  as  bridging the gap between the two self-contained extremes,  the self-
contained I and the self-contained not-I, and providing nothing less than immediate access
to the prestressed isolated-autonomous-and-self-contained-not-I, 
and 
in the same breath it brings into force both complete determination and the basic predicative
thing-structure (N.B. as something rooted in the isolated, autonomous and self-contained not-I and
reflecting  its  intrinsic  nature);  or,  to  be  more  precise,  what  Fichte  terms “intermediary
intuition” brings into force both 
b.1) complete determination of the isolated, autonomous and self-contained not-I (its
intrinsic being-so-and-not-otherwise) and 
b.2) the basic predicative thing-structure (the basic predicative structure of the not-I) – in
such a manner that these two components merge with each other: b.1) takes the form
of b.2) and vice versa.
All in all, a ‘thing’ (Ding) results from the epigenesis and complete merging of two
different kinds of reflection. It is made both of the just-mentioned formal framework (the
unity between complete determination and the predicative structure as an essential feature
of the not-I) and of the concrete predicate(s) viz. the complete determination resulting from
the particular kind of reflection the said wavering between possibilities (das Schweben)
and the said ruling or verdict – i.e. Bild or image – are all about. 
And this has two main implications. 
First, Mittelanschauung turns out to be a sine qua non for image (Bild) as such. It provides
the focal point and structural blueprint for all images. The point is that the
identification of the intuitive content without which there is no image (i. e, the
identification of the intuitive content every image is all about) is in turn intrinsically
related to the prestressed isolated-autonomous-and-self-contained-not-I. Or, more
a. 
a. 
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precisely, the identification of the intuitive content without which there is no image is
intrinsically directed to the not-I as it bears the imprint of the aforementioned unity between
complete determination and the predicative structure. In short, the identification of the
intuitive content without which there is no image is intrinsically related to the ‘thing’
as such (the ‘thing’ every image as such is opposed to). So that every image is, by its
nature, the image of a thing. 
Secondly, what it all amounts to is that Fichte’s “intermediary intuition”, too – insofar
as it is a) a sine qua non for image (Bild) and indeed b) what puts both the latter and the I
in contact with the prestressed isolated-autonomous-and-self-contained-not-I – turns
out to be a sine qua non for any ‘thing’ as such. And there is no exaggeration in saying
that it functions as an ‘Archimedean point’ for all ‘things’. It, too, remains unconscious
and hides, as it were, behind its product.82 It is an intuition: it does full justice to the
name and forgets itself in its object. But none of this changes the fact that without it
there would simply be no ‘things’ as such.
Having said that, it is important to bear in mind the following points. 
First, as pointed out above, Fichte’s remarks refer to five main components: the two
activities giving rise to the intuitive ‘thing-content’ (namely a) the devising and weighing
activity of free imagination b) the ascertaining or ruling activity), c) the ensuing Bild, d)
Mittelanschauung, e) the corresponding Ding. From these, all the activities of the I (i. e.
both the weighing and the ruling activity without which there would be no Bild and the
“intermediary intuition” without which there would be no Ding)  remain completely
unnoticed. To be sure, they play a decisive role and would be no doubt detected by an
observer (a cognitive witness or “observing intellect”) – but not from the standpoint of the I
in question. For the latter, the only two discernible components in sight are Bild and
Ding. 
Secondly, the connection between Bild and Ding is such that they have the very same
intuitive content. And for the said “observing intellect” a) they are both the result of the
“original explanation” (that is, of the “original reflection” viz. of the activity of the I)
and, what is more, b) they are absolutely interdependent.83 But,  on the other hand,
there  is  a  world  of  difference between  them.  Taken  at  face  value,  the  object  of
Mittelanschauung – das Ding – has nothing whatsoever to do with the activity of the I: it
is the purely not-I related not-I. Whereas the image (Bild) betrays its origin. As Fichte puts
it, it is the means whereby the I puts the not-I as a product of its activity84 The activity of
the I cannot be caught in flagranti.85 It can only make its appearance indirectly, i. e. as a
product:  “(…)  however,  the  I  is  never  immediately  conscious  of  its  own  acting;
consequently, it can posit what is required as its product only indirectly by means of a
new act of reflection.” (Aber das Ich wird, wie bekannt, seines Handelns unmittelbar sich nie
bewusst;  es  kann demnach das  geforderte  nur  mittelbar  durch  eine  neue Reflexion  als  sein
Product setzen).86 In short, image or Bild is the only way in which the I can become aware
of its not-I related activity and “posit the opposed and limiting not-I as its product”
(das entgegengesetzte, begrenzende Nicht-Ich setzen, als sein Product).87 And the point is that
it becomes aware of its own acting because the not-It in question, namely Bild, appears
as a product of absolute freedom (als Product der absoluten Freiheit)88: “The distinguishing
feature of such a product is that it could also be something else and could be posited as
such” (und das Kennzeichen eines solchen ist, dass es auch anders seyn könne, und als anders
seyend gesetzt werden könne)89. Or, as Fichte also puts it: “It becomes my product because
I must posit it as absolutely determined by my own spontaneous activity (Es wird mein
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Product, weil ich es als durch absolute Selbstthätigkeit bestimmt setzen muss.)90 And that is
what Bild is all about: it is constituted in such a way that through it “the I is regarded as
positing its  product as such,  that  is,  as  forming images” (als  setzend sein  Produkt  als
solches oder als bildend).91
The objective counterpart (i. e. the very same intuitive content as ‘thing’ or Ding) is of a
wholly different nature: “Insofar as the I posits this image as a product of its activity, it
necessarily opposes it to something which is not a product of this activity, that is, to
something which is no longer determinable but is instead completely determined by
itself without any contribution from the I. This is the actual thing to which the creative
I conforms in designing its image, and of which it must necessarily have a vague notion
as it forms this image. (Inwiefern das Ich dieses Bild setzt, als Product seiner Thätigkeit, setzt
es demselben nothwendig etwas entgegen, das kein Product derselben ist; welches nicht mehr
bestimmbar, sondern vollkommen bestimmt ist, und, ohne alles Zuthun des Ich, durch sich selbst
bestimmt ist. Dies ist das wirkliche Ding, nach welchem das bildende Ich in Entwerfung seines
Bildes sich richtet, und das ihm daher bei seinem Bilden nothwendig vorschweben muss.)92
Finally, this brings us to two important points. 
The first has to do with Fichte’s insistence on what might be described as the alternate
dominance of Bild and Ding – viz. the fact that their interdependence does not prevent
them from being in a way mutually exclusive.93 The point is that there is something of an
either/or between a) understanding a given intuitive content as a Ding or ‘thing’ and b)
understanding it as a Bild or ‘image’. To be sure, the two sides of this either/or refer to
each  other (for  they  are  mutually  interdependent).  But  the  fact  remains  that  they
correspond  to  two  substantially  different  ways  of  understanding the  same  intuitive
content.  Mutatis  mutandis,  we can perhaps compare Fichte’s Bild and Ding to the so-
called “Gestalt switch” in cases of ambiguous or bi-stable perception,  like Rubin’s well-
known reversible figures:  images admitting two mutually exclusive interpretations, in
such a way that only one of them can be experienced at a given moment. In other
words, Bild and Ding are as two sides of the same coin. You can look at it (you can look
at the intuitive content) either from one side or from the other. But you cannot merge
the two and look from both sides at the same time. In other words, Bild and Ding are visible
from  two  irretrievably  separate  points  of  observation,  and  there  is  an  irreducible
parallax gap between them.94 
This in turn paves the way for the second important aspect we cannot fail to mention,
namely the connection between the polarity we are talking about (the polarity between
Bild and Ding) and the very idea of truth as adequation – that is, the whole understanding
of the connection between the subjective (viz. the I-related) not-I and the objective not-
I95 in terms of adequation. 
Fichte writes: “This intuition is the basis of all the harmony which we assume to exist
between things and our representations of them. As we have said, we produce an image
spontaneously; it is easy to explain and to justify how we are able to view this image as
our  product  and  to  posit  it  within  ourselves.  But  this  image  is  also  supposed  to
correspond to something outside of us – to something which was neither produced nor
determined by the image, to something which exists independent of the image and in
accordance with its own laws. It is not easy to see what right we have to make such a
claim, or even to see how we could ever come to make this claim at all – unless we have
at the same time an immediate intuition of the thing. If we convince ourselves that
such an immediate intuition is necessary, we will not be able to resist for very long the
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conviction that the thing [which is directly intuited] must lie within ourselves, since we
cannot act directly upon anything except ourselves.” (Diese Anschauung ist  der Grund
aller  Harmonie,  den  wir  zwischen  unseren  Vorstellungen  und  den  Dingen  annehmen.  Wir
entwerfen unserer eigenen Aussage nach durch Spontaneität ein Bild, und es lässt sich gar wohl
erklären und rechtfertigen, wie wir dasselbe als unser Product ansehen, und es in uns setzen
können.  Nun  aber  soll  diesem  Bilde  etwas  ausser  uns  liegendes,  durch  das  Bild  gar  nicht
hervorgebrachtes, noch bestimmtes, sondern unabhängig von demselben nach seinen eigenen
Gesetzen existirendes entsprechen;  und da lässt  sich denn gar nicht einsehen,  nicht nur mit
welchem Rechte wir so etwas behaupten, sondern sogar nicht, wie wir auch nur auf eine solche
Behauptung kommen mögen, wenn wir nicht zugleich eine unmittelbare Anschauung von dem
Dinge  haben.  Ueberzeugen  wir  uns  nur  einmal  von  der  Nothwendigkeit  einer  solchen
unmittelbaren Anschauung, so werden wir auch die Ueberzeugung, dass demnach das Ding in
uns selbst liegen müsse, da wir auf nichts unmittelbar handeln können, als auf uns selbst, nicht
lange zurückhalten können.)96 
And then he adds: “As we have just seen, the I is completely free when it is engaged in
forming  images.  The  image  has  the  specific  character  that  it  does  because  the  I
determines the image in one way rather than another (which, of course, it could also
have done). Because it is thus freely determined, the image can be related to the I and
can be posited within the I as its product. But this is not supposed to be an empty
image. It is supposed to correspond to a thing outside of the I. It must, therefore, be
related to this thing. We have just seen how the I gains access to the thing, thus making
possible the relationship between the two, namely, by means of an immediate intuition
of  the  thing,  an  intuition  which  must  be  presupposed.  The  image  is  completely
determined insofar as it is related to the thing: it has to be precisely this image and not
some other one, because the thing is completely determined, and the image is supposed
to  correspond to  it.  This  complete  determinacy  provides  the  basis  for  relating  the
image to the thing. Not the slightest difference now remains between the image and
the immediate intuition of the thing. In saying this,  we are obviously contradicting
what was said before; for anything that must necessarily be what it is and which cannot
be something else is not a product of the I, nor can it be posited in the I or related to it.”
(Im Bilden ist das Ich völlig frei, wie wir soeben gesehen haben. Das Bild ist auf eine gewisse Art
bestimmt, weil das Ich dasselbe so und nicht anders, welches es in dieser Rücksicht allerdings
auch könnte, bestimmt; und durch diese Freiheit im Bestimmen wird das Bild beziehbar auf das
Ich, und lässt sich setzen in dasselbe, und als sein Product. Aber dieses Bild soll nicht leer seyn;
sondern es soll demselben ein Ding ausser dem Ich entsprechen: es muss demnach auf dieses
Ding bezogen werden. Wie das Ding dem Ich für die Möglichkeit dieser Beziehung zugänglich
werde, nemlich durch eine vorauszusetzende unmittelbare Anschauung des Dinges, ist soeben
gesagt worden. Insofern nun das Bild bezogen wird auf das Ding, ist es völlig bestimmt, es muss
gerade so seyn, und darf nicht anders seyn; denn das Ding ist vollkommen bestimmt, und das
Bild  soll  demselben  entsprechen.  Die  vollkommene  Bestimmung  ist  der  Beziehungsgrund
zwischen dem Bilde und dem Dinge, und das Bild ist jetzt von der unmittelbaren Anschauung des
Dinges  nicht  im  geringsten  verschieden.  Dadurch  wird  dem  vorhergehenden  offenbar
widersprochen; denn was nothwendig so seyn muss, wie es ist, und gar nicht anders seyn kann,
ist kein Product des Ich, und lässt sich in dasselbe gar nicht setzen, oder darauf beziehen.)97 
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3. See notably KrV, B 167, Kant (1900ff.), III: 128. For further discussion of this metaphor and its
Kantian use see notably Piché (2001), Mensch (2013), and Helbig & Nassar (2016).
4. De anima, Aristotle (1961): 414 b 20ff.
5. EWL, FSW I, 343-344, GA I/3, 154-155. Translations borrowed from Breazeale (1988), with slight
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6. EWL, FSW I, 344, GA I/3, 155.
7. EWL, FSW I, 344, GA I/3, 155.
8. A full  discussion of all  three claims would go far beyond the scope of this paper.  We will
therefore focus on the first and the second. The third aspect must be left for another occasion.
9. EWL, FSW I, 331, GA I/3, 143. 
10. EWL, FSW I, 331, GA I/3, 143.
11. EWL, FSW I, 331, GA I/3, 143.
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30. See p. 3 above.
31. EWL, FSW I, 341, GA I/3, 152.
32. EWL, FSW I, 341, GA I/3, 153.
33. EWL, FSW I, 341, GA I/3, 153.
34. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 153.
35. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 153.
36. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 153.
37. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 153.
38. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 153.
39. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 154.
40. EWL, FSW I, 342, GA I/3, 154.
41. EWL, FSW I, 342-343, GA I/3, 154.
42. EWL, FSW I, 349, GA I/3, 159.
43. EWL, FSW I, 343, GA I/3, 154.
44. EWL, FSW I, 346, GA I/3, 156.
45. EWL, FSW I, 346, GA I/3, 156.
46. Cf. EWL, FSW I, 366ff., GA I/3, 172ff.
47. EWL, FSW I, 368, GA I/3, 174.
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58. EWL, FSW I, 360, GA I/3, 168. 
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61. EWL, FSW I, 368, GA I/3, 174.
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63. EWL, FSW I, 368, GA I/3, 174. 
64. Cf. EWL, FSW I, 374, GA I/3, 179: “I now reflect upon its individual properties – upon
its shape, for instance, its size, its colour, etc. – and I posit them in my consciousness.”
(Ich reflectire jetzt  auf die einzelnen Merkmale desselben,  z.B.  auf seine Figur,  Grösse,  Farbe
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65. And this means: no immediate ‘book’, no immediate ‘table’, no immediate ‘spectacles’, etc. 
66. And therefore, as the exact opposite of a result (and a fortiori as the exact opposite of the result
of a subjective activity). 
67. The overarching “second not-I” Fichte describes in the following terms (EWL, FSW I, 374, GA I/
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Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen). For the latter has nothing to do with devising (or for that
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intuition. 
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71. See notably Sophist, 261c6-264b8, Plato (1867): 171-179, Theaetetus, 189e6-190a7, Plato (1861):
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transformation,  not  just  the  idea  of  registration,  is  what  Plato’s  inner  ‘clerk’  or
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sondern  von  der  vollkommenen  Bestimmtheit  des  vorstellenden  Ich  in  Auffassung  eines
Merkmals,  wovon als  Beispiel  man sich  indessen  die  Figur  eines  Körpers  im Raume denken
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80. EWL, FSW I, 375, GA I/3, 179-180. See also EWL, FSW I, 376, GA I/3,181, where Fichte speaks of
the intuition in question as a “middle term” (Mittelglied) and EWL, FSW I, 383, GA I/3, 185-186. 
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82. Cf. EWL, FSW I, 376-377, GA I/3, 180-181.
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follows:  An  image  must  not  be  possible  without  a  thing,  and  a  thing  must  not  be
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ABSTRACTS
This paper focuses on Fichte’s transcendental account of what it takes to make a thing, as laid out
in his 
Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre
. It tries to work out which ‘ingredients’ are necessary to make a ‘thing’ (viz. an ‘object’) and what
their connection is with each other. The point is that a) Fichte’s account of the said ‘ingredients’
in his 
Grundriss(notably Anstoss,
Empfindung, Anschauung, Vermögen zu setzen oder nicht zu setzen, reines Nicht-Ich, Bild,
Mittelanschauung
, andDing
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proper) differs from all others, b) his understanding of each and every one of these ‘ingredients’
is surprisingly ground-breaking (and proposes nothing less than a completely new approach to
the ‘ingredients’ in question, c) pretty much the same holds true for Fichte’s view on their
connection with each other – so that d) the 
Grundrissgives a very singular answer to the question ‘what is a thing?’.
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sensation, intuition, image, intermediary intuition
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